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NOTES
EXECUTION OF THE INSANE*
In the history of murder, the onset of insanity while await-
ing execution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon.1
The purpose of this paper will be to explore selected ramifi-
cations of the onset of such insanity. A brief review of the his-
tory and rationale behind the exclusion of the mentally incom-
petent from execution is included as well as an analysis of
Supreme Court decisions on the issue. Other controversial topics
which are examined include the quality of legal services afforded
the indigent in a capital case and the uncertainties felt by
mental health professionals concerning the ethics of providing
treatment to an incompetent death row inmate when the ulti-
mate goal of such treatment is to return the inmate to compe-
tency for the purpose of execution.
INTRODUCTION
The law recognizes that the presence of mental illness af-
fects criminal liability in several ways.2 It is widely recognized
that certain conditions and circumstances serve to relieve an ac-
cused from criminal responsibility.' The rationale behind such a
policy is that it is unjust to impose criminal sanctions upon an
individual who is not capable of responsible action.4 Moreover, it
is common that where a defendant is suffering from a mental
illness during proceedings against him, such proceedings are to
be suspended.' Here, the individual is afforded protection based
on the notion that one should not stand trial when one's mental
* The author would like to thank New York Law School Professor Michael L. Perlin
for his invaluable assistance.
1. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA
L. REv. 381 (1962).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 381-82.
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condition prevents one from making a meaningful defense.6
The presence of mental illness affects criminal liability in a
third, and perhaps, more controversial way. The exclusion of the
convicted but mentally incompetent 7 prisoner from execution
has a history in Anglo-American law dating back to the medieval
period.'
The traditional rationales behind proscribing the execution
of the insane are found in the works of the common law com-
mentators from the past.9 Bracton' ° opined that the incompe-
tent should be spared execution because of their lack of reason. 1
Coke 2 maintained that such executions would be a "miserable
spectacle" and that the taking of the life of an insane person did
not serve as an example to others and thus had no deterrent
value. 3 Blackstone 4 and Hale'5 defended the stay of execution
on the ground that such a person could not aid in his or her
defense.'6 Blackstone also argued that the prisoner's insanity
was sufficient punishment in and of itself. 7 Sir John Hawles
wrote that executing a presently incompetent prisoner denied
him the chance to make peace with God.'8
The desire for retribution is another basis upon which the
rule exempting the insane from execution has been explained. 9
Retribution has been distinguished from the desire for ven-
geance in that "it is immaterial for vengeance whether the de-
fendant is sane or not; the important thing is to exterminate the
6. Id. at 382.
7. For purposes of this note, the terms "mentally incompetent" and "insane" are
often used interchangeably to denote incompetency at the time of execution.
8. Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent,
32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 778 (1980).
9. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 2, at 383.
10. 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (S. Thorne trans.
1968).
11. Id. See Note, supra note 8, at 778 n.62.
12. E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 4 (London 1979) (1st ed. London 1628).
13. Id. at 6. Note, supra note 8, at 778 n.62. For a discussion on Coke's views, see
Hazard & Louisell, supra note 2 at 384-85.
14. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 395-96 (13th ed. 1800).
15. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (1736).
16. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 2, at 383-84.
17. Id. at 384.
18. Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 STATE TRIALS
474, 478 (Howell ed. 1816); see Note, supra note 8, at 778 n.62.
19. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 2, at 386.
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wrongdoer."20 However, if retribution is the suggested justifica-
tion for capital punishment-that every wrong must be met with
a punitive act of equal value-then presumably "killing an in-
sane person does not have the same moral quality as killing a
sane one." 21 Thus, it could be concluded that executing the in-
sane is improper, for then a punishment of inequal quality is
inflicted.22
Explanations for the purpose of exempting the insane pris-
oner from execution (hereinafter referred to as the "exemption
rule"), are met with persuasive counter-arguments. In response
to the premise that insanity prevents the defendant from think-
ing of some reason why the death penalty should not be carried
out, supporters of the execution of convicted prisoners argue
that it is improbable that offenders who were sane at the time of
trial and sentencing would have any new and relevant informa-
tion to offer in aid of a defense.23 It is also noted that the "same
reasoning would be sufficient to postpone-perhaps indefi-
nitely-the execution of a sane man, for if it be assumed that
intelligent reflection will disclose reasons for a stay of execution,
then time for reflection should be allowed the sane as well."
24
The argument that the defendant's insanity in itself is suffi-
cient punishment is counterbalanced by the view that it is not
recognized as an appropriate sentence since the offender who re-
covers sanity is still executed.25 Furthermore, it is suggested that
it is an inverted humanitarianism that permits one to escape
capital punishment only if insane.26
Against the supposition that the execution of an insane per-
son loses its ability to act as a deterrent, proponents of such an
execution argue that the death penalty does act as a deterrent
because the potential murderer will know that even subsequent
insanity will not relieve one of punishment.2 7 Such supporters of
20. Id.
21. Id. at 387.
22. Id.
23. Zenoff, Can an Insane Person Be Executed? (1985-1986) A.B.A. PREVIEW, Issue
No. 16 (June 27, 1986), 465, 466.
24. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 2, at 383.
25. Zenoff, supra note 23.
26. Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 144, 159, 208 P.2d 668, 676-77 (1949) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
27. Zenoff, supra note 23.
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the imposition of the death penalty also note that retribution is
being served if it is viewed as taking a life for a life.28
Finally, it is argued that a theological rationale for the ex-
emption rule (that the condemned should have a chance to make
peace with his or her maker), is no longer legitimate given the
pluralistic society that exists today.2 9 The theological rationale
has also been weakened by the argument that one's eternal
destiny depends more on the general tenor of one's life, rather
than the frame of mind at the particular moment of death. 0
Thus, although many explanations have been offered, there
is no general agreement as to why there should be a rule pro-
scribing the execution of mentally incompetent capital inmates.
Indeed, some commentators observe that the uneasiness over in-
voking the insanity exemption may represent deeper public mis-
givings about the death penalty itself.
3 1
While there is no general consensus concerning the exemp-
tion rule, its existence at common law was widely recognized,
and as sociologist Michael Radelet and psychiatrist George Bar-
nard note, "this attitude toward the mentally incompetent death
row inmate carried over to nineteenth century America, [where]
legislators and courts to this day continue to voice prohibitions
against the execution of the mentally incompetent."32
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EXECUTION OF THE INSANE
Between 1897 and 1958, the Supreme Court on several occa-
sions reviewed cases which involved the execution of prisoners
who had become insane after conviction and sentencing. 3
The Court first considered the issue in 1897, in Nobles v.
Georgia.34 In Nobles, the petitioner asserted that due process
was violated by a state procedure whereby a claim of post-sen-
tencing insanity was determined by the sheriff, with the assis-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 2, at 388 (citing Archbishop William Temple).
31. Kenner, Competency on Death Row, 8 INT'L. J. LAW & PSYCH. 253, 254 n.6 (1986).
32. Radelet & Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric Determination of Competency to
Be Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 37, 38 (1986); see also Ward, Competency
for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 72-76 (1986).
33. Note, supra note 8, at 774 n.46.
34. 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
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tance of a twelve-member jury."
After noting that at common law an insane person was not
to suffer punishment,3 6 the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of what procedures were necessary for determining the existence
of insanity after conviction and sentencing.3 The Court rejected
Nobles' assertion that a judicial proceeding, "surrounded by all
the safeguards and requirements of a common law jury trial"3 8
was required, and held that no right to trial by jury existed. The
Court reasoned that the prisoner had the benefit of a jury trial,
and that "[t]he plea at this stage is only an appeal to the hu-
manity of the court to postpone the punishment until a recovery
takes place, or as a merciful dispensation.
'39
The Court expressed concern that if a prisoner were entitled
to a trial by jury on the question of insanity after sentence, the
punishment of a defendant would "depend solely upon his fe-
cundity in making suggestion after suggestion of insanity, to be
followed by trial upon trial."' 0
Thus, in Nobles, the Supreme Court concluded that a sug-
gestion of insanity made after the verdict and sentence of a pris-
oner did not give rise to an absolute right on the part of a con-
vict to have the issue tried before the court and a jury."1 The
Court stressed the importance of leaving to the discretion of a
judge the most appropriate procedure for determining the sanity
of a defendant already sentenced to die. 2 Because at common
law the prisoner had no inherent right to a jury trial on the issue
of supervening insanity, the Court concluded that the matter
was one of legislative regulation and ruled that Georgia's proce-
dure did not deny the inmate due process.
43
The Supreme Court did not consider the issue again for
fifty years, when a due process challenge to another Georgia law
was examined in Solesbee v. Balkcom." The Georgia procedure
35. Ward, supra note 32, at 69.
36. Nobles, 168 U.S. at 406.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 405.
39. Id. at 407.
40. Id. at 406.
41. Id. at 409.
42. Id. at 408.
43. Id. at 409. Ward, supra note 32, at 70.
44. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
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at issue in Solesbee vested discretionary authority in the Gover-
nor, who, with the aid of physicians, was to determine whether a
condemned prisoner had become insane after sentencing.' 5 The
Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment required that an assertion
of insanity after sentence be settled by a "judicial or administra-
tive tribunal, after notice and hearings in which he could be rep-
resented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses and offer evi-
dence.""6 The Court also found that no constitutional defect was
created because the Governor's decision was not subject to judi-
cial review.
47
In holding that the procedure did not deny the petitioner
due process, the Supreme Court compared the procedure at is-
sue to an executive reprieve or grant of clemency, powers gener-
ally free from judicial review.' 8 Citing the Georgia Supreme
Court, the Court noted that the Georgia scheme was "motivated
solely by a sense of 'public propriety and decency'-an 'act of
grace' which could be 'bestowed or withheld by the State at will'
and therefore not subject to due process requirements."' 9 The
Solesbee Court reiterated concerns found in Nobles that requir-
ing judicial review every time a convicted defendant suggested
insanity could result in an indefinite stay of execution.50 The
Court stated that "[t]o protect itself, society must have power to
try, convict, and execute sentences.
'51
The sole dissenter in Solesbee, Justice Frankfurter, stated
that executing the presently incompetent violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment because "it offends our
historic heritage to kill a man who has become insane while
awaiting sentence. '5' He noted that not a single state had "up-
rooted the heritage of the common law which deemed it too bar-
barous to execute a man while insane, 53 and concluded that:
45. Id. at 10.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 11.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id. at 13.
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id. at 22.
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[I]f the deeply rooted principle in our society against kill-
ing an insane man is to be respected, at least the mini-
mum provision for assuring a fair application of that
principle is inherent in the principle itself. And the mini-
mum assurance that the life-and-death guess will be a
truly informed guess requires respect for the basic ingre-
dient of due process, namely, an opportunity to be al-
lowed to substantiate a claim before it is rejected. 4
The next significant case considered by the Supreme Court,
Caritativo v. California,55 decided in 1958, involved an attack on
a California statute which provided a prison warden with the ex-
clusive means for initiating a judicial proceeding to determine
an inmate's sanity. The California Supreme Court had held that
unless and until a prison warden began a sanity inquiry, the
courts lacked jurisdiction to rule on the question of a prisoner's
sanity or to review a warden's determination.56 Citing Solesbee
v. Balkcom the Supreme Court upheld the California Supreme
Court's ruling in a one sentence opinion.57 Justice Frankfurter
again dissented, this time joined by Justices Brennan and Doug-
las.58 While Justice Frankfurter did not suggest that the due
process clause required a formal judicial proceeding or a formal
adversary hearing before a warden, he did insist upon a
mandatory requirement that a procedure be instituted to ensure
that the warden listen to a claim of insanity postured by the
condemned prisoner.5 9 He noted that, "because the initial evalu-
ation by the warden was both final and ex parte, the due process
clause required a better opportunity for a hearing."60
Thus, by 1958 the Supreme Court had reviewed the consti-
tutionality of several state procedures governing the execution of
insane prisoners and had concluded that the due process clause
did not require a judicial determination of competency before
execution. However, by that time three United States Supreme
Court Justices were of the belief that the Federal Constitution
54. Id. at 23.
55. 357 U.S. 549 (1958).
56. Ward, supra, note 32, at 71.
57. Caritativo, 357 U.S. at 550.
58. Id. at 552.
59. Id. at 557.
60. Id. at 558. Ward, supra note 32, at 71.
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did not tolerate the execution of the insane, and that the right of
an insane man not to be executed merited more procedural pro-
tection than was afforded by an ex parte proceeding which pro-
vided no opportunity to the condemned to be heard on the life
or death issue involved.
Such was the state of the law when in 1985 the Supreme
Court granted Alvin Bernard Ford's petition for certiorari in
Ford v. Wainwright,61 to resolve the issue of whether the eighth
amendment prohibits the execution of the insane.2
In an opinion which examined the history of american legal
development in the area as well as *the Common Law of Eng-
land,6" the Court ruled 5 to 4 that executing the insane violates
the United States Constitution and that Florida's procedures for
determining the sanity of a death row prisoner were not "'ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing' on the critical issue," and
therefore, were unconstitutional." This decision rendered all
state statutes with provisions like the Florida statute at issue in
Ford unconstitutional. At the time of the decision, 41 states had
a death penalty or statutes governing execution procedures."'
Twenty-six states have statutes which require that the execution
of a prisoner who is legally incompetent be suspended.6 Other
states, by judicial decision, have adopted the common law pro-
scription against execution of the insane. 17 Some jurisdictions
61. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
62. Id. at 403.
63. U.S. Supreme Court Bars Execution of the Insane, N.Y.L.J., June 27, 1986.
64. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
65. Id. at 405 n.2.
66. Id. Justice Marshall cited: ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-4023 (1978); ARK STAT. ANN. § 43-2622 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3703 (West
1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-112(2) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101 (1985); FLA.
STAT. § 922.07 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-62 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 38, § 1005-2-3
(1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4006(3) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.240(2) (1985); MD. ANN.
CODE, Art. 27, § 75(c) (1985 Supp.); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57(2) (Supp. 1985); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 522.060 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2537 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.445 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:482 (West 1981); N.M.
STAT ANN. § 31-14-6 (1984); N.Y. CORREc. LAW § 656 (McKinney Supp. 1986); NC. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1001 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.29 (1982); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §
1008 (1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-24 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-13
(1982); Wyo, STAT. § 7-13-901 (Supp. 1985). Id.
67. Id. See State v. Allen, 204 La. 513, 515, 15 So. 2d 870, 871 (1943); Commonwealth
v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 22-23, 117 A.2d 96, 99 (1955); Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 89-90
135 S.W. 327, 329 (1911); State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 696 (1940).
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have adopted a more discretionary statutory approach by sus-
pending the sentence of a convicted prisoner and providing for
transfer to a mental facility." The remaining states which have
a death penalty have no specific procedures concerning the onset
of insanity, but have not repudiated the common law rule.69
It is clear that states will have to tailor their statutory pro-
cedures to encompass the Ford decision; what is left unclear by
the Ford decision, however, is exactly what procedures are nec-
essary to satisfy due process.
ALVIN BERNARD FORD
On July 21, 1974, Alvin Bernard Ford, with the aid of three
accomplices committed the armed robbery of a Fort Lauderdale,
Florida restaurant. The three accomplices, fearing that the po-
lice had been alerted, left the scene of the crime before the rob-
bery had been completed. 7' Ford remained behind to secure
$7,000 from the restaurant's safe.71 When police officer Dimitri
Walter Ilyankoff appeared to investigate, Ford shot and killed
the officer without provocation. 7' The trial court found that the
defendant shot the decedent without warning twice in the body,
grievously wounding him. Then, despite the decedent's pleas for
help and after he no longer constituted a threat to the defend-
ant's safety, or his escape and while the decedent was in fact
completely helpless, the defendant again shot the decedent, this
time in the head causing his immediate death. 7a Ford was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to death.7' Subse-
quent appeals of his conviction in the state and federal court
systems continued for seven years.75
68. Id. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 406 (1979); IND. CODE § 11-10-4-2 (1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 279 § 62 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-7 (1984); S.C. CODE § 44-23-220
(1985); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.01 (Vernon 1979).
69. Id. See also Appendix I from the Brief of the Office of the Capital Collateral
Representative et al. as amici curiae for an overview of different procedures used by the
states. Brief for Office of the Capital Collateral Representative at 61, Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
70. Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496, 497 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 502 n.1.
74. 451 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1984).
75. Zenoff, supra note 23, at 465.
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Throughout this period Ford's mental condition was not at
issue.76 However, in early 1982, Ford began to display gradual
behavioral changes.7
[Ford suffered from a] pervasive delusion that he had be-
come the target of a complex conspiracy involving the
[Ku Klux] Klan and assorted others, designed to force
him to commit suicide. He believed that the prison
guards, part of the conspiracy, had been killing people
and putting the bodies in the concrete enclosures used
for beds. Later, he began to believe that his women rela-
tives were being tortured and sexually abused somewhere
in the prison. This notion developed into a delusion that
the people who were tormenting him at the prison had
taken members of Ford's family hostage. . . .[b]y 'day
287' of the 'hostage crisis,' the list of hostages had ex-
panded to include 'senators, Senator Kennedy, and many
other leaders .... He began to refer to himself as 'Pope
John Paul, III,' and reported having appointed nine new
justices to the Florida Supreme Court.78
For the next eighteen months, Ford was evaluated periodi-
cally by defense psychiatrists. On the basis of evaluations, re-
corded conversations between Ford and his attorneys, Ford's
written correspondence and medical records as well as interviews
with Ford's acquaintances, the treating psychiatrist concluded
that Ford suffered from a "severe, uncontrollable, mental dis-
ease which closely resemble[d] 'Paranoid Schizophrenia With
Suicide Potential,' a 'major mental disorder... severe enough to
substantially affect Mr. Ford's present ability to assist in the de-
fense of his life."
79
76. At the time of trial Ford was examined by Dr. David Taubel who testified that
although Ford "had a basic hostility towards society," Ford was intelligent, had previ-
ously held jobs of considerable responsibility and understood the nature and quality of
his acts. Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d at 500-01 n.1.
77. Ford, 477 U.S. at 402.
78. Id.
79. Id. Ford subsequently refused to see the psychiatrist again, believing that he had
now joined the conspiracy against him. Later, Ford "regressed further into nearly com-
plete incomprehensibility, speaking only in a code characterized by intermittent use of
the word 'one,' making statements such as 'Hands one, face one, Mafia one. God one,
father one. Pope one. Pope one. Leader one.'" (App.) at 72. Id. at 403.
[Vol. V
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Subsequently, Ford's attorney invoked the Florida statute
governing the determination of competency of a condemned in-
mate.80 Pursuant to the procedures set forth in the statute, Gov-
ernor Bob Graham named a commission of three psychiatrists to
evaluate whether Ford had "the mental capacity to understand
the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was im-
posed upon him."8 " In one session, the three psychiatrists inter-
viewed Ford for approximately thirty minutes in the courtroom
at the Florida State Prison. 2 An attorney from the governor's
office as well as correctional officers, two paralegals and two de-
fense attorneys also attended the session. 3 Following the session
with Ford, the state-appointed psychiatrists examined his cell
and spoke with correctional officers. They also reviewed his
medical records and consulted the medical staff concerning
Ford's condition.8 4 Two of the psychiatrists also reviewed re-
80. Ford, 477 U.S. at 403. Text of Florida statute 922.07 (1983).
Proceedings when a person under sentence of death appears to be insane.
1. When the Governor is informed that a person under a sentence of death may
be insane, he shall stay execution of the sentence and appoint a commission of
three psychiatrists to examine the convicted person. The Governor shall notify
the psychiatrists in writing that they are to examine the convicted person to
determine whether he understands the nature and effect of the death penalty
and why it is to be imposed upon him. The examination of the convicted person
shall take place with all three psychiatrists present at the same time. Counsel for
the convicted person and the state attorney may be present at the examination.
If the convicted person does not have counsel, the court that imposed the sen-
tence shall appoint counsel to represent him.
2. After receiving the report of the commission, if the Governor decides that the
convicted person has the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death
penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him, he shall issue a warrant
to the warden directing him to execute the sentence at a time designated in the
warrant.
3. If the Governor decides that the convicted person does not have the mental
capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed
on him, he shall have him committed to the state hospital for the insane.
4. When a person under sentence of death has been committed to the state hos-
pital for the insane, he shall be kept there until the proper official of the hospital
determines that he has been restored to sanity. The hospital official shall notify
the Governor of his determination, and the Governor shall appoint another com-
mission to proceed as provided in subsection (1).
5. The Governor shall allow reasonable fees to psychiatrists appointed under the
provisions of this section which shall be paid by the state.
81. Id.
82. Zenoff, supra note 23, at 465.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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ports of the defense psychiatrists and some of Ford's correspon-
dence .8 Each doctor then filed a separate two- to three-page re-
port with the Governor.86 Although they varied in their
diagnoses of Ford's mental condition, each doctor concluded
that Ford understood that he was facing the death penalty. 7
Therefore, there was agreement on the issue of sanity as defined
by Florida law."
No further administrative or judicial proceedings are re-
quired under Florida law. The statute provides that after receiv-
ing a commission's report (from the three psychiatrists), the gov-
ernor is to sign a death warrant "if he decides that the examinee
has the required mental capacity."89 After refusing to consider
psychiatrists' reports submitted by the defense, Florida governor
Bob Graham, who had a publicly announced policy of not per-
mitting advocacy by the inmate's counsel on the issue of compe-
tency, 90 signed a death warrant for Ford's execution, without ex-
planation or statement."1
Ford's counsel subsequently petitioned for a hearing in state
court to determine Ford's competency to be executed.92 A peti-
tion for habeas corpus9 3 was filed in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. In attempting to ob-
tain an evidentiary hearing on the question of Ford's sanity,
counsel noted that the three diagnoses offered by the three psy-
chiatrists appointed by the Governor to examine Ford conflicted
with each other. Counsel also drew attention to the fact that
there had been many challenges made by other psychiatrists to
85. Id.
86. Id. See Fla. statute 922.07 (1983), supra note 80.
87. "One doctor concluded that Ford suffered from 'psychosis with paranoia' but had
,enough cognitive functioning to understand the nature and the effects of the death pen-
alty, and why it is to be imposed on him." Another found that, although Ford was
"psychotic," he did "know fully what can happen to him." The third concluded that
Ford had a "severe adaptational disorder," but did "comprehend his total situation in-
cluding being sentenced to death, and all of the implications of that penalty." Ford, 477
U.S. at 403.
88. Id.
89. See Fla. statute 922.07 (1983), supra note 80.
90. Amicus curiae brief submitted by Office of Collateral Representative, supra note
69, at 13. (The Supreme Court made no critical mention of the Governor's policy).
91. Ford, 477 U.S. at 403.
92. Id.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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the methods of the three Governor-appointed psychiatrists."
The petition was denied without a hearing. Counsel for Ford ap-
pealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
granted a certificate of probable cause and stayed Ford's execu-
tion." Subsequent attempts by the state to vacate the stay of
execution were unsuccessful. 96 The appellate court then ex-
amined Ford's claim and a divided panel concluded that the dis-
trict court's denial of the writ should be affirmed.97 Citing Goodev. Wainwright,9" a case which had previously examined the same
Florida statute at issue in Ford, the court held that the Florida
statute met minimum standards of procedural due process.99 Re-
jecting Ford's claim that his case was distinguishable from
Goode and that Solesbee v. Balkcom was no longer binding au-
thority, the court stated that "[i]f our application of Solesbee
and Goode is to be altered, it must be done by the Supreme
Court or at least by this court sitting en banc.' '0°
In his dissent from the court of appeals decision, Judge
Clark stated that the court should have resolved whether Ford
had a substantive constitutional claim before analyzing the due
process requirements.'01 He concluded that "[a]n application of
the Supreme Court's analysis of Eighth Amendment claims to
the issue in question in this case leads to the conclusion that the
execution of one who is presently insane would violate the
Eighth Amendment."'' 1 Because the Florida procedure did not
adequately protect Ford's eighth amendment right not to be ex-
ecuted while insane, Judge Clark would have reversed the dis-
trict court and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)' 3 to determine whether Ford
94. Ford, 477 U.S. at 403.
95. Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538 (11th Cir. 1984).
96. 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
97. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1985).
98. 731 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1984). In Goode, the eleventh circuit rejected an attack
on the same Florida statute involved in Ford. The court held that the statute met mini-
mum standards required by procedural due process. Goode, 731 F.2d at 1483.
99. 752 F.2d at 528.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 529.
102. Id. at 530.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
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was insane.""
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
As noted, the Supreme Court had previously examined the
constitutionality of state procedures governing the execution of
the insane in several cases, but Ford was the first time it had
considered the issue since its 1962 decision of Robinson v. Cali-
fornia05 making the eighth amendment applicable to the states.
After noting that "our interpretations of the Due Process Clause
court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a
State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for
the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a
written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia,
shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall
otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit -
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate
to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court
proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a:
full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceedings; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is pro-
duced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of
such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is
not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one
or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1)
to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by
the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of para-
graph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as
a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest
upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determi-
nation by the State court was erroneous.
104. 752 F.2d at 535.
105. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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and the Eighth Amendment have evolved substantially since
this Court last had occasion to consider the infliction of the
death penalty upon the insane," '06 Justice Marshall began his
analysis with the common law proscription against executing a
prisoner who has lost his sanity. Citing authorities such as
Blackstone, Coke, and Hale, Marshall concluded that virtually
no authority existed at English common law condoning the exe-
cution of the insane.'0 7 After observing that this "solid proscrip-
tion was carried to America where. . .'the judge [was] bound' to
stay the execution upon insanity of the prisoner,""' Justice
Marshall noted that this "ancestral legacy has not outlived its
time."'1 9 Marshall, concluding that no state currently permits
execution of the insane,"0 held that the eighth amendment must
be construed to prohibit a state from enforcing the execution of
a prisoner who is insane."' "Whether its aim be to protect the
condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understand-
ing, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity
of exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforce-
ment in the Eighth Amendment.""' 2
After settling the substantive eighth amendment issue, Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that Florida's statutory procedures for
determining a condemned prisoner's sanity provided inadequate
assurance of accuracy to satisfy the requirement of Townsend v.
Sain,"'3 which held that "in a habeas corpus proceeding, a fed-
eral evidentiary hearing is required unless the state court trier of




106. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404. Justice Marshall noted that the Supreme Court had never
considered whether there was a right under the eighth amendment to a judicial determi-
nation of sanity after conviction and sentence. Previous cases which had examined the
issue had arisen before the eighth amendment had been made applicable to the states.
See United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S.
431 (1948). In Ford, Marshall stated that "now that the Eighth Amendment has been
recognized to affect significantly both the procedural and the substantive aspects of the
death penalty, the question of executing the insane takes on a wholly different complex-
ion." Ford, 477 U.S. at 404.




111. Id. at 406.
112. Id.
113. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
114. Ford, 404 U.S. at 406 (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13).
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Justice Marshall noted that "because execution is the most irre-
mediable and unfathomable of penalties," the Court has re-
quired that factfinding measures in capital proceedings "aspire
to a heightened standard of reliability."' 15 Thus, Justice Mar-
shall concluded that the determination of a prisoner's sanity as a
predicate to execution demands the same standards as in any
other aspect of a capital proceeding.' 1 6 Therefore, having been
denied a fact-finding procedure "adequate to afford a full and
fair hearing" on the critical issue as required by 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2),"7 petitioner was entitled to a de novo evidentiary
hearing in the district court on the question of his competence
to be executed." 8 Justice Marshall based his findings on the fact
that the Florida scheme precluded a prisoner or his counsel from
presenting material relevant to the petitioner's sanity, thereby
excluding the prisoner from the truth-seeking process."" Citing
Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Solesbee, Justice Marshall
pointed out "the minimum assurance that the life and death
guess will be a truly informed guess requires respect for the ba-
sic ingredient of due process, namely, an opportunity to be al-
lowed to substantiate a claim before it is rejected.'
' 20
In elaborating upon the resultant prejudice to petitioner
when denied the opportunity to present evidence, Justice Mar-
shall also quoted from his opinion in Ake v. Oklahoma,'2' noting
that because "psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on
what constitutes mental illness. . .the fact-finder must resolve
differences in opinion within the psychiatric profession 'on the
basis of the evidence offered by each party' when a defendant's
sanity is at issue in a criminal trial."'12 2 Justice Marshall noted
that this was equally so after conviction, where a prisoner's rep-
resentative might offer potentially probative information at least
115. Id. at 407.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 103 for text of statutes.
118. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
119. Id. at 408.
120. Id.
121. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). In Ake the Supreme Court held that "when a defendant has
made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a
significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psy-
chiatrist's assistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one." Id.
122. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (quoting from Ake 470 U.S. at 77).
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as worthy of consideration as the state's. 12 3 The failure to con-
sider such information, according to Justice Marshall, created an
increased likelihood of an erroneous decision."' In addition, Jus-
tice Marshall based his findings on the fact that the Florida
scheme precluded the prisoner from challenging or impeaching
the opinions of the state-appointed psychiatrists. 25 Citing Wig-
more for the premise that "[c]ross-examination... is beyond any
doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
the truth," Justice Marshall concluded on this point that the
Florida procedure was likely to result in "distorted" decisions,
by denying the prisoner's attorney the right to question the state
experts' opinions or methods.
12
1
Finally, he reasoned that the most striking defect in the
Florida procedures was the fact that the final determination of a
prisoner's competency to be executed was vested solely in the
executive branch. 27 He stated, "the commander of the State's
corps of prosecutors cannot be said to have the neutrality that is
necessary for reliability in the fact-finding proceeding."' 28 Not-
ing that historically, a stay of execution was required by law and
not left to judicial or executive discretion, Justice Marshall
stated that there was no basis either in history or logic for plac-
ing the prisoner's fate in the untouchable hands of the state's
chief executive. 29 "In no other circumstance of which we are
aware," Justice Marshall concluded "is the vindication of a con-
stitutional right entrusted to the unreviewable discretion of an
administrative tribunal."' 30
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, joined the major-
ity on the substantive eighth amendment issue. After reviewing
the common law proscription against the execution of the in-
sane, Powell concluded that such a practice was cruel and un-
usual punishment and barred by our Constitution. 3 ' Justice
Powell went further than the Court's opinion by addressing the
123. Id.







131. Id. at 412.
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issue of the definition of insanity in this context. 11 2 Citing sev-
eral standards,13 he concluded that the "Eighth Amendment
forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the pun-
ishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer
it. ' 134 Noting that the petitioner's psychiatrist stated that peti-
tioner was of the belief that the death penalty had been abol-
ished, Justice Powell concluded that "if this assessment is cor-
rect, petitioner cannot connect his execution to the crime for
which he was convicted. 13 5 Therefore, Ford's claim of insanity
would fit the applicable standard for a stay of execution. 3 '
Justice Powell wrote separately to express his differing
viewpoint on the procedures a state must adhere to in order to
avoid de novo review in federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d).137 Conceding that the findings of "a State court of com-
petent jurisdiction" must be given great deference, Justice Pow-
ell observed that "no amount of stretching" could extend the
definition of state court to encompass the Governor.1 3 8 Noting
that "[t]he essence of a 'court' is independence from the
prosecutorial arm of government," Justice Powell agreed with
Justice Marshall that the Governor's finding of sanity was not
entitled to a "presumption of correctness" under the habeas
statute, and that Florida's procedures (whereby the question of
petitioner's sanity appeared to have been resolved exclusively on
the examinations and evaluations of state-appointed psychia-
trists), did not comport with due process requirements as they
invited "arbitrariness and error by preventing the affected par-
ties from offering contrary medical evidence or even from ex-
plaining the inadequacies of the State's examinations."1
3 9
While he concluded that the Florida procedures at issue did
not meet basic fairness standards, Justice Powell felt that the
requirements of due process were not as extensive as Justice
Marshall had indicated and did not require the kind of "full-
132. Id. at 410.
133. Id. at 412 n.3.
134. Id. at 413.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 410. See supra note 103 for text of statute.
138. Ford, 477 U.S. at 413.
139. Id. at 414.
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scale sanity trial" that Marshall would have invoked. 140 More-
over, Justice Powell stated that the Court's prior decisions which
had imposed heightened procedural safeguards in capital cases
were inapplicable,"" since the petitioner had already validly
been convicted and sentenced to death. Therefore, the State had
a "substantial and legitimate interest in taking the petitioner's
life as punishment for his crime. "142 Thus, because the question
at issue was not "whether petitioner's execution may take place,
but when," Justice Powell concluded that a claim of insanity
made after conviction was not entitled to the heightened proce-
dural safeguards afforded an individual in other stages of a capi-
tal case. 43
Because the petitioner had not been declared incompetent
to stand trial, Justice Powell noted that the petitioner was not
making his claim of insanity against a "neutral background,"'' "
and that therefore a presumption of sanity should continue to
the ends of executing the sentence.' 45 Thus, the state may re-
quire a "substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to
trigger the hearing process. "146
Finally, Justice Powell noted that the issue of sanity in the
petitioner's case differed from issues of historical fact in that the
question of the petitioner's sanity required a subjective judg-
ment, the determination of which "depends substantially on ex-
pert analysis in a discipline fraught with 'subtleties and nu-
ances.' " 47 Citing Parham v. J.R.,"' he reasoned that in such a
140. Id.
141. Id. Justice Powell cited Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion)
and Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Justice Powell did not define "neutral background." This author assumes
that Justice Powell was referring to the fact that because the petitioner's legal history
did not include any finding of mental illness, his present claim of insanity should be
evaluated in light of that fact. Perhaps Justice Powell meant that if a petitioner with a
present claim of insanity had a history of mental illness, a lower standard of proof would
be necessary to substantiate the current claim of insanity.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 70).
147. Ford, 477 U.S. at 415.
148. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). New York Law School Professor Michael Perlin notes that
"Justice Powell's reliance on Parham v. J.R .... is astonishing when applied to a death
penalty case. . . . Parham countenanced looser procedural safeguards in the juvenile
commitment context, in part, because of the assumption that 'natural bonds of affection
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situation, conventional adversarial procedures, requiring testi-
mony, cross-examination, and oral argument, do not necessarily
represent the best means of arriving at sound, consistent judg-
ments concerning a defendant's sanity.14 9
Accordingly, Powell concluded that something far less for-
mal than a trial would be sufficient to safeguard the petitioner's
constitutional rights.150 For example, using an impartial officer
or board to examine evidence and hear argument from the peti-
tioner's counselor, including expert psychiatric evidence offered
to contradict the state's psychiatric evidence would meet basic
due process requirements.' 5' Noting that states should be per-
mitted considerable discretion to determine the process that
most effectively balances the various interests at stake, Justice
Powell observed that "as long as 'basic fairness was ob-
served'. . . due process would be satisfied.' 5 However, because
the petitioner had raised a viable claim under the eighth amend-
ment which was not adjudicated fairly within the meaning of
due process, Justice Powell joined the Court's judgment and
concluded that Ford was entitled to a habeas hearing in federal
court.
51
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice White joined, con-
curred in the result in part and dissented in part.15 She stated:
I am in full agreement with Justice Rehnquist's conclu-
sion that the Eighth Amendment does not create a sub-
stantive right not to be executed while insane... Because
however, the conclusion is for me inescapable that Flor-
ida positive law has created a protected liberty interest in
avoiding execution while incompetent, and because Flor-
ida does not provide even those minimal procedural pro-
tections required by due process in this area, I would va-
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.' Certainly, no one would sug-
gest that such a benign motive propels state action in a capital punishment case." Perlin,
The Supreme Court, The Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Val-
ues: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or Doctrinal Abyss?, 29 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 77
(1987) (footnote omitted).








cate the judgment and remand to the Court of Appeals
with directions that the case be returned to the Florida
system so that a hearing can be held in a manner consis-
tent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. I
cannot agree, however, that the federal courts should
have any role whatever in the substantive determination
of a defendant's competency to be executed.'55
Justice O'Connor quoted from Hewitt v. Helms'56 in noting
that liberty interests protected by the fourteenth amendment
may arise from either the due process clause or the laws of the
states.'5 7 Agreeing with Justice Rehnquist, she concluded that
"the due process clause does not independently create a pro-
tected interest in avoiding the execution of a death sentence
during incompetency.' 58 However, she found it quite clear that
the provision of the Florida code (providing that the Governor
"shall" have the prisoner committed to a Department of Correc-
tions mental health treatment facility if the prisoner "does not
have the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death
penalty and why it was imposed on him,") did create an ex-
pected liberty interest protected by the due process clause.' 59
Thus, Justice O'Connor noted that despite the fact that a state
may consider certain methods adequate for ascertaining the
"preconditions to adverse official action," it is federal law which
mandates and defines the procedural safeguards a state must af-
ford an individual prior to official state action which would re-
sult in a deprivation of a protected liberty or property
interest. 60
Although she concluded that Florida law had created a sub-
stantive right not to be executed while insane, and that the de-
mands of the due process clause were thus implicated, Justice
O'Connor noted that in this context such demands were mini-
mal.' ' Observing the significance of the prisoner's interest in
eluding the ramifications of an erroneous determination, she
155. Id.
156. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
157. Ford, 477 U.S. at 415.
158. Id.
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stated that "substantial caution" need be exercised "before
reading the Due Process Clause to mandate anything like the
full panoply of trial-type procedures. ' ' 161 In support of this, she
observed that once an individual is validly convicted, the state
has a fixed right to punish and the requirements of due process
are reduced accordingly. 163 Moreover, Justice O'Connor felt that
expanding the reading of the due process clause in this context
would create an enormous incentive for making false claims,
thereby creating a vehicle for deliberate delay."" "By defini-
tion," she stated, the defendant's protected interest in a stay of
execution can "never be conclusively and finally deter-
mined. . .until the very moment of execution . . ,
Notwithstanding the fact that she felt the states should
have broad discretion in this area, Justice O'Connor found one
facet of the Florida procedure to be constitutionally lacking.'66
Noting that, "[i]f there is one 'fundamental requisite' of due
process, it is that an individual is entitled to an 'opportunity to
be heard,'" she found that the Florida procedure for determin-
ing competency for execution precluded the defendant from act-
ing in any adversarial manner during the examination. 67 In de-
fining the parameters which would be constitutionally sufficient
to safeguard the petitioner's rights, Justice O'Connor stated that
oral advocacy or cross-examination would not always be neces-
sary. However, she concluded that "due process at the very least
requires that the decision-maker consider the prisoner's written
submissions." '"6
Thus, Justice O'Connor would vacate with orders to the
eleventh circuit to return the case to the Florida state courts, to
assess the defendant's competency in accordance with the com-
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. Justice O'Connor continued, "[rlegardless of the number of prior adjudi-
catons of the issue, until the very moment of execution the prisonpr can claim that he




167. Id. Justice O'Connor noted "[bly executive order, the present Governor has pro-
vided that '[c]ounsel for the inmate and the State Attorney may be present [at the ad-
versary hearing] but shall not participate in the examination in any adversarial manner."
Executive Order No. 83-137 (Dec. 9, 1983) Ford, 477 U.S. at 417.
168. Ford, 477 U.S. at 417.
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mand of the fourteenth amendment.1"9 She reiterated that the
"only federal question presented in cases such as this is whether
the State's positive law has created a liberty interest and
whether its procedures are adequate to protect that interest
from arbitrary deprivation."' 70 If those procedures are adequate,
then, "a federal court has no authority to second guess a state's
substantive competency determination.
' '17 1
Justice Rehnquist, with whom the Chief Justice joined, dis-
sented. 72 Justice Rehnquist felt that the Florida procedures
conformed to the common law tradition as well as current prac-
tice on which the court purports to rely, as at common law it was
the executive who decided whether the condemned was compe-
tent for execution.173 Thus, stated that in removing the determi-
nation of sanity from the executive branch, the Court did so
"not in keeping with but at the expense of 'our common-law her-
itage.' ,,174 Justice Rehnquist found that since there already ex-
isted a uniform view among the states that the insane should not
be executed, it would be superfluous to "create a constitutional
right that no State seeks to violate . "... ,17' Relying on Solesbee
v. Balkcom, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that:
[W]holly executive procedures can satisfy due process in
the context of a post-trial, post-appeal, post-collateral at-
tack challenge to a State's effort to carry out a lawfully
imposed sentence. Creating a constitutional right to a ju-
dicial determination of sanity before that sentence may
be carried out, whether through the Eighth Amendment
or the Due Process Clause, needlessly complicates and
postpones still further any finality in this area of the law.
The defendant has already had a full trial on the issue of
guilt, and a trial on the issue of penalty; the requirement
of still a third adjudication offers an invitation to those
who have nothing to lose by accepting it to advance en-




172. Ford, 477 U.S. at 417 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 419.
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be made at any time before sentence and, once rejected,
may be raised again; a prisoner found sane two days
before execution might claim to have lost his sanity the
next day, thus necessitating another judicial determina-
tion of his sanity and presumably another stay of his
execution.
176
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that since the Florida law at is-
sue embodied the principle that the insane should not be exe-
cuted, and also provided for the means (through executive
branch procedures), to evaluate claims of insanity, the peti-
tioner's due process rights were fully protected. 177
In contrast to Justice O'Connor's opinion that the Florida
statute had created a liberty interest protected by the due pro-
cess clause, Justice Rehnquist stated that the only right the
Florida statute offered the condemned prisoner was the opportu-
nity to apprise the Governor of the fact that the prisoner may be
insane.178 In his interpretation of the Florida law, Justice Rehn-
quist placed great emphasis on the fact that the language of the
statute read "[ilf the Governor decides that the convicted per-
son does not have the mental capacity to understand the nature
of the death penalty and why it was imposed on him, he shall
have him committed to a Dept. of Corrections mental health
treatment facility.
1 79
Thus, for Justice Rehnquist, the fact that the state's highest
executive examined a prisoner's claim of insanity satisfied due
process. 180 Accordingly, he concluded that the Florida law did
not grant the petitioner "the sort of entitlement that gives rise
to the procedural protections for which he contends," and dis-
sented from the majority's opinion.18'
In ruling that the Florida procedures for determining com-
petency for execution were unconstitutional, the Court gave rec-
ognition to the fact that due process requires impartiality in a
decision concerning the fate of a man's life.
Although Justice Rehnquist asserted that the insane should
176. Id.
177. Id. at 418.
178. Id. at 419.
179. Id.
180. Id, at 418.
181. Id. at 419.
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be protected from execution, such protection is illusory where an
ex parte proceeding is the means by which such protection is to
be afforded. It cannot be assumed that a Governor will accept
and consider all evidence proffered on behalf of the condemned.
Indeed, in Ford's case, his counsel was prohibited from partici-
pating in the state-psychiatric examination of him. Moreover, as
Justice O'Connor notes, the Florida Governor's office refused to
acknowledge whether it would even review the psychiatric
materials submitted by Ford's attorney.' 2 The failure to receive
evidence from a condemned person who asserts a claim of in-
competency results in a one-sided and hence, distorted, analysis.
State-appointed psychiatrists cannot be afforded a presumption
of impartiality. "By eliminating the opportunity to be heard,
Florida denies the decisionmaker potentially important proba-
tive information on a matter that is often subject to reasonable
professional disagreement.'
1 83
The five justice majority in Ford v. Wainwright held that a
condemned prisoner has an eighth amendment right not to be
executed while insane. In so holding, the Court concluded that
both the common law and the current practices of the states
supported such a decision. As a result of the constitutionaliza-
tion of such a right, states will have to provide safeguards that
comply with the due process demands of the fourteenth
amendment.
Although the Court agreed that the Florida procedures were
182. Id. at 417.
183. In criticizing the Florida procedures used to determine the petitioner's compe-
tency for execution the American Psychiatric Association, in an amicus curiae brief
stated:
1. The psychiatric evaluation process itself is flawed by design. By tolerating
quick group evaluations by the state-appointed psychiatrists, the Florida proce-
dures do not allow for the kind of careful and comprehensive examination that is
necessary to reach reliable professional opinions on the issue of competency.
2. The failure to allow consideration of the reports and opinions of psychiatric
experts retained by the prisoner violates basic principles of fairness. By elimi-
nating the opportunity to be heard, Florida denies the decisionmaker potentially
important probative information on a matter that is often subject to reasonable
professional disagreement.
3. The determination of a prisoner's competency depends not only on a medical
diagnosis, but also on the ability to relate prisoner's competency to be subject to
cross examination information might have led him to a different conclusion, and
the level of confidence with which he holds that opinion.
Amicus curiae brief, A.P.A. at 7.
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unconstitutional, there was no consensus over what procedure a
state must follow to protect the right not to be executed while
insane. While the plurality opinion made it clear that an ex
parte decision made by the executive branch will not suffice, the
Court left to the individual states the task of developing ade-
quate procedures.
184
The only concrete guidelines set by the Ford decision can be
gleaned from the Court's perceived inadequacies in Florida's
procedure for determining competency. While it can be said
with some certainty that "an opportunity to be heard" must be
afforded the condemned, it is not clear exactly what that stan-
dard demands. Given that the Court yielded three opinions on
the issue, each of which differed on the question of what
processes are necessary to satisfy due process, the Supreme
Court's failure to mandate explicit procedures for determining
the competency for execution will likely result in future litiga-
tion on the issue.1 85
DISCUSSION
Ford v. Wainwright raises the spectre of issues ranging from
the quality of legal services afforded the indigent to the role of
the mental health profession in judicial insanity determinations.
Much debate and analysis is possible on either topic: a brief
overview will be provided here.
The notion that condemned inmates flood the judicial sys-
tem with frivolous appeals was advanced by Justice Lewis Pow-
ell in a 1983 speech to the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Confer-
ence."'0 Powell maintained that persons "convicted five or six
184. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410 n.4. As a result of the decision in Ford, Florida Governor
Graham requested the Supreme Court of Florida to promulgate a rule regarding compe-
tency to be executed. See, "In re Emergency Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rule 3.811, Competency to be Executed). 497 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1986). The
emergency rule provides for judicial review of a determination by the Governor (pursu-
ant to section 922.07) that a condemned prisoner is competent for execution. Written
submissions from the parties shall be considered by the judge assigned to hear the mo-
tion, but oral argument, including the live testimony of witnesses, is discretionary.
185. As Professor Perlin notes, "the difficulty which is always faced in the application
of a plurality opinion will be increased here where the states have enacted such a wide
range of statutory vehicles for making the critical determination, and where it is truly
not clear what sort of procedures a state need enact to meet Ford's standards." Perlin,
supra note 148, at 76.
186. Hengstler, Attorneys for the Damned, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1987, at 56.
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years ago" persist in having "[t]heir cases of repetitive review
move sluggishly through our dual system.""18 Complaining about
the burdens inflicted upon overburdened judges in having to ex-
amine eleventh-hour applications for stays of executions made
by counsel for death row inmates, Justice Powell maintained
that the system irrationally permits abuse of process.'8 8 Indeed,
one of the fears expressed by Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist
in Ford was that false and spurious claims would be made by
defendants who had "nothing to lose."'89
New York University Law Professor Anthony Amsterdam,
in a speech to the American Society of Criminology, noted that
statistics do not support the assertion that in capital cases ap-
peals are often frivolous and repetitive.' "Between 1976 and
1983, the federal courts of appeals decided a total of 41 capital
habeas appeals and ruled in favor of the condemned inmate in
30, or 73.2 percent of them."' 9 Amsterdam stated:
Consider for a moment what this means. In every one of
these cases, the inmate's claims had been rejected by a
state trial court and by the state's highest court, at least
once and often a second time in state post-conviction
proceedings; the Supreme Court had usually denied cer-
tiorari at least once and sometimes twice: and a federal
district court had then rejected the inmate's claims of
federal constitutional error infecting his conviction and/
or death sentence. Yet in over 70 percent of the cases, a
federal court of appeals found merit in one or more of
the inmates' claims. These figures surely suggest that the
'repetitive review' condemned by Justice Powell is not
entirely without justification or social benefit in a society
which cares not to kill people in violation of its funda-
mental law.'
92
Amsterdam suggested that the Supreme Court was guilty of
187. Id.
188. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS 50
(Winter 1987).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 164 & 176.
190. Hengstler, supra note 186, at 56.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 57. For a review of state and federal post-conviction procedures, see Am-
sterdam, supra note 188.
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"betraying America's heritage," stating, "patient, painstaking re-
view of the legal claims of condemned inmates has been the rule
of judicial responsibility, not because the task was convenient,
efficient or gratifying, but because its omission was unthinkable.
That it should come to be begrudged within our generation tells
us much about ourselves." '193
One explanation which has been offered for the number of
appeals taken before a meritorious claim is noticed is the quality
of counsel afforded most capital inmates. 9 "
Judge Alvin Rubin, in Riles v. McCotter,96 (a case which
affirmed the death penalty for Raymond Riles, who was con-
victed of murder during an armed robbery), concurred that if
Riles' counsel at trial had been more capable, the jury might not
have imposed the death penalty. 9 ' Judge Rubin emphasized
that the Constitution does not require that the accused be repre-
sented by effective counsel, only that the representation not be
ineffective.19 7 He concluded that, "[c]onsequently, accused per-
sons who are represented by 'not-legally-ineffective' lawyers may
be condemned to die when the same accused, if represented by
effective counsel, would receive at least the clemency of a life
sentence."'198
The importance of effective legal representation is high-
lighted in capital cases, where the stakes involved are higher
than in other cases.
In a clinical study of fifteen death row inmates scattered
throughout five states, researchers concluded that "many con-
demned individuals probably suffer a multiplicity of unrecog-
nized psychiatric and neurological disorders that are relevant to
considerations of mitigation."' 99 The researchers questioned why
such serious disorders had never previously been identified or
presented at the trial, sentencing, or appellate stages. 0 The au-
193. Id. at 56.
194. Id. at 57.
195. 799 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1986).
196. Id. at 955.
197. Id.
198. Id. (emphasis omitted).
199. D. Lewis, J. Pincus, M. Feldman, L. Jackson & B. Bard, Psychiatric, Neurologi-
cal, and Psycho-educational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United
States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 842 (July 1986) [hereinafter Lewis].




[T]he possibility, exists that death row inmates comprise
an especially neuropsychiatrically impaired prison popu-
lation whose pervasive inadequacies make them less ca-
pable than other defendants either of obtaining compe-
tent representation at the time of trial or assisting their
attorneys in the time-consuming work of documenting
the kinds of neuropsychiatric impairments that would be
significant for purposes of mitigation.0'
Capital punishment, as the most severe and irremediable
form of punishment imposed, is intended to be utilized only
where serious offenses have been committed and where few miti-
gating factors are present. 02 Thus, the importance of effective
legal representation is highlighted in capital cases not only be-
cause of the greater stakes involved, but also because there are
potential unique mitigating factors surrounding a portion of
death row inmates. Without the aid of effective counsel such
mitigating circumstances will probably go unnoticed and conse-
quently unfairly affect the fate of the condemned.
Because prisoners have no constitutional right to an attor-
ney after direct appeal, in many states the condemned are not
entitled to legal representation on a habeas corpus appeal.
20 3
And even in states which do provide funds for indigent capital
offenders, compensation is generally so low that most private at-
torneys do not become involved.20 4
Gary Hengstler, a news editor for the American Bar Associ-
ation Journal, notes that "[a]mong the concerns surrounding the
death penalty, none is greater than the quality of representation
available to indigents."20 5 United States Court of Appeals Judge
Abner J. Mikva notes that approximately 99.5 percent of the al-
most 1,800 prisoners on death row are indigent.2 °0
Many authors have also recognized the disparate treatment
201. Id.
202. Id. at 838.
203. Hengstler, supra note 186, at 57 (quoting Ronald Tabak, special counsel at
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom).
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of minority group members in the application of the death pen-
alty.20 7 It is well-documented that prosecutors possess an enor-
mous amount of discretion in deciding which avenues of prose-
cution to pursue and that "decisions of prosecutors to seek the
death penalty are related to [such factors] as the race of the vic-
tim and defendant. ' 208 Thus, it has been noted that, "Our legal
system is incapable of providing justice in these highly emo-
tional cases.
2 0 9
THE ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN THE "CURE
THAT KILLS"'2 1
Heated debate surrounds the role of psychiatrists and other
mental health professionals in these insanity inquiries.2 ' One
aspect of the debate involves the reliability of psychiatric evalu-
ations in general. In Ford v. Wainwright, Justice Powell, (quot-
ing from Addington v. Texas)212 noted that the question of the
petitioner's sanity required a subjective judgment, the determi-
nation of which depends "substantially on expert analysis in a
discipline fraught with 'subtleties and nuances.' ",213 Justice
207. Id. Tabak, concludes:
[A] popular misconception about capital punishment is the belief that our legal
system guarantees the fair imposition of the death penalty .... My experiences
over the last four years - which have ranged from a victory in the United States
Supreme Court to the execution of a client - have left me shaken by the inabil-
ity of our legal system to treat fairly the indigent defendants accused of capital
crimes. I have been amazed to find an extreme lack of fairness in every stage of
death sentence cases and at least one fundamentally unfair aspect to every capi-
tal case I have handled.
Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death
Penalty in the 1980's, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797, 798-99 (1986).
208. Meltsner & Wolfgang, Introduction, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 659 (1983). It
has been noted that "for a case to become a capital case, the prosecutor must decide to
seek the death penalty. This decision frequently involves political considerations. Since
most prosecutors are elected officials, they are subject to community pressure in deciding
what penalty to seek." Tabak, supra note 207, at 799. See also Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde,
Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 301 (1962).
209. Tabak, supra note 207, at 848.
210. Adler, The Cure That Kills, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 1 (1986).
211. See, e.g., Radelet & Barnard, supra note 32.
212. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In Addington, the Supreme Court concluded that a stan-
dard of clear and convincing evidence was the appropriate burden of proof in involun-
tary civil commitment cases.
213. Ford, 477 U.S. at 415 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 430).
NOTES
Marshall also commented on the role of the psychiatric profes-
sion in sanity determinations. Quoting from his opinion in Ake
v. Oklahoma, he noted that psychiatrists frequently disagree on
what behaviorial symptoms constitute mental illness and the ap-
propriate diagnosis to be attached to the behaviors.2 14
While the accuracy of psychiatric diagnoses and evaluations
may always be criticized, for purposes of this paper, it will be
assumed that the practice of psychiatry is a necessary and valua-
ble aspect of insanity inquiries. However, there are certain issues
unique to the treatment of a death row inmate that must be rec-
ognized. Therefore, the focus of the discussion will concentrate
on the use of mental health professionals in the care and treat-
ment of those prisoners awaiting execution.
One of the most critical areas of debate is the dubious relia-
bility of psychiatric evaluations performed in a prison setting.215
It is important to note that the environment in which an evalua-
tion occurs often influences the diagnosis that is made by the
psychiatrist.218 Thus, it has been suggested that when a court-
appointed psychiatrist examines a defendant sitting in a locked
jail cell or in a clinical setting, his diagnosis of that person is
naturally going to be influenced somewhat by the context in
which the interview takes place.217
An additional area for concern is the degree to which the
psychological stress attendant to an existence on death row it-
self, is likely to produce behavioral aberrations.1 Indeed, "[i]t
is difficult to imagine a source of psychological stress more ex-
acting than being forced to live the spasmodic certainty and un-
certainty of being sentenced to die." 1 9 Justice Stevens has
observed:
In capital cases, however, the punishment is inflicted in
two states. Imprisonment follows immediately after con-
214. Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 75).
215. Ward, supra note 32, at 76.
216. Gordon, Crystal-Balling Death?, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 49 (1978).
217. Id.
218. West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, 45 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIA-
TRY 689, 694 n.30 (1975) ("the process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so
degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture").
Id. at n.30.
219. Strafer, Volunteering for Execution, 74 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 860, 867
(1983).
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viction: but the execution normally does not take place
until after the conclusion of post-trial proceedings in the
trial court, direct and collateral review in the state judi-
cial system, collateral review in the federal judicial sys-
tem, and clemency review by the executive department of
the State. However critical one may be of these pro-
tracted post-trial procedures, it seems inevitable that
there must be a significant period of incarceration on
death row during the interval between sentencing and ex-
ecution. If the death sentence is ultimately set aside or
its execution delayed for a prolonged period the impris-
onment during that period is nevertheless a significant
form of punishment. Indeed, the deterrent value of incar-
ceration during that period of uncertainty may well be
comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step
itself.2 e
Doctors Bluestone and McGahee, in their landmark study of
prisoners on death row in 1962, made a very similar observa-
tion. 21 Their case studies of eighteen men and one woman
awaiting death in Sing Sing prison supports the hypothesis that
stress from an impending death sentence causes inmates to re-
sort to a number of defense mechanisms"' of mainly three
types-denial,2 2 8 projection, 22  and obsessive rumination.22 5 It
220. Coleman v. Balkom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari).
221. Bluestone & McGahee, REACTION TO EXTREME STRESS: IMPENDING DEATH BY Ex-
ECUTION, 119 AMER. J. PSYCHIATRY 393-96 (1962).
222. Id. at 395.
223. The authors suggest that:
[T]he most common form of denial is isolation of affect. 'So, they'll kill me; and
that's that'-this said with a shrug of the shoulders suggests that the affect ap-
propriate to the thought has somehow been isolated. A second common form of
denial is to minimize the gravity of the present situation and to take for granted
the fact that an appeal would be successful. The third and most extreme mani-
festation of denial, used by only one individual, was to believe delusionally that
a pardon had been granted.
Id. at 395.
224. The authors state that
projection is an obvious, and not uncommon, mechanism. Typically, it takes the
form of persecutory delusions. At least three of our prisoners considered them-
selves persecuted by specific groups in the community. This mechanism converts
dissolute criminals into martyrs. It is a comforting delusion. While it does not
deny that death is just around the corner, it tries to lend it dignity and meaning.
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has also been concluded that Bluestone and McGahee's descrip-
tions of the defense mechanisms of the condemned prisoners ex-
amined in their study suggest the presence of underlying psy-
chosis in several of the inmate-subjects.226 However, Professor
Kenner notes that it is important not to confuse an inmate's use
of defense mechanisms with symptoms of a major mental ill-
ness.221 To do so, according to Professor Kenner, would place the
death row inmate in a "no-win-situation. ' 221 If the condemned,
by using defense mechanisms to alleviate some of the pain of
impending death was to be declared unfit for execution, the con-
demned would be placed in the anomalous position of being exe-
cuted when he feels the pain of his upcoming death the most,
that is, after his defense mechanisms are no longer successful. 2 9
The use of such defense mechanisms and the observation of
mental illness in condemned inmates is not surprising given the
inhumane conditions pervading death rows and the crippling
and life-negating effects of such degrading surroundings.230 Ac-
cording to recent studies and lawsuits, death row inmates gener-
ally are not integrated into the prison population, do not have
access to rehabilitative programs, have little opportunity to ex-
ercise, and are confined to their cells for extraordinarily long pe-
riods of time.23' It has long been recognized that chronic periods
of inactivity coupled with severe physical restrictions such as in-
In some men there seems to be an almost quantitative reciprocal relationship
between the use of projection and introjection so that they are either overly
paranoid or depressed.
Id.
225. The authors observed three kinds of obsessive rumination. The first involved
thinking "furiously about something else," so that the '"depressing thought is elbowed
out of consciousness by the crowd of other ideas." Id. The authors cite a "morbid obses-
sional concern about the preparing of appeals or pleas for clemency" as an example. Id.
Another type of obsession exhibited was the "preoccupation with religion to the exclu-
sion of everything else." Id. at 396. "The third type of obsessive rumination is the intel-
lectual: a dipping into philosophical thought by a man whose life had hitherto been de-
voted to hedonistic pursuits." Id.
226. Lewis, supra at 839.
227. Kenner, supra note 31 at 255.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Strafer, supra note 219, at 869. For a review of documented nation-wide death
row conditions, see id. at 870 n. 37.
231. Strafer, supra note 219, at 230-31.
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cell confinement causes increased tension and violence.2 32 Such
conditions only exacerbate the unique stresses experienced by
the death row population who often await for years, in abysmal
conditions, for "decisions entirely beyond their control and pos-
sible comprehension." ' Indeed, it has been suggested that
"[w]hile the sentence of death itself is a source of considerable
and often debilitating stress, the 'social environment' in which
the trauma of imminent death is experienced can itself 'play a
critical role in determining the nature and outcome of coping
efforts.' "2134
In contrast to the dying patient whose 'social environ-
ment' often is made life-affirming through the intentional
enhancement of personal autonomy, conditions on death
rows are designed to be life-negating. The remote physi-
cal locations of the prisons, limited visitation rights, and
the indignities forced upon both inmate and visitor when
those rights are invoked stand in stark contrast to the
support systems available to a terminally ill patient. Ap-
parently abandoned by the living, the condemned are
subjected to 'massive deprivations of personal autonomy'
on death row.
35
The same author also concludes that:
[T]he image of death row existence as itself a 'living
death' is reflected in the attitudes of death row inmates
whose expressions of suicidal impulses or desires to waive
their appeals are continually connected to their thoughts
about 'living' on death row. 36
The rule prohibiting the execution of an insane inmate has
232. Id. at 873 n.48.
233. Gallemore & Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement,
129 AMER. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167 (1972).
234. Strafer, supra note 219, at 871 n.38.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 871, 872. Strafer notes that, "[tihe lure of suicide, either by direct action
or by enlisting the assistance of the State, as a release from this intense psychological
torture may be as great for the innocent as for the guilty. Isidore Zimmerman once came
within a few minutes of being electrocuted, When the time finally approached he report-
edly welcomed the news and was disappointed when he was reprieved. Zimmerman was




several ramifications on the role of the psychiatrist or other in-
volved mental health professional. Initially, when a claim of
mental incompetency or insanity is raised by a condemned, a
mental health practitioner will be asked to perform an evalua-
tion of the condemned's competency for execution. If it is deter-
mined that the condemned is not competent, then presumably
another mental health practitioner will be requested to provide
treatment. Finally, a mental health practitioner will be asked to
render an opinion on whether a condemned who has undergone
treatment has been restored to sanity.237 An affirmative answer
can ring the death bell for the condemned.
Perhaps, in the final analysis, the question becomes whether
and to what degree a psychiatrist ethically may participate at all
in either a diagnostic or therapeutic capacity.2 38 One author,
Barbara Ward, observes that while doctors, who are sworn to
preserve life, have always been involved with the death penalty
process in some form, ("by issuing death certificates following
executions, examining an inmates's neck to determine the opti-
mal rope length for hanging, examining and counseling death
row inmates, and resuscitating condemned inmates who attempt
suicide") the role of a participating psychiatrist in the compe-
tency for execution proceedings differs substantially. 3 9 She
notes that while "competent inmates in the capital prison popu-
lation would have died anyway, psychiatric participation in this
process may help effectuate an execution which might not other-
wise have occurred.
2 40
Some commentators suggest that psychiatrists should take
no part in such competency proceedings-that it denigrates the
entire profession. 241 The fact is stressed that as a physician, the
psychiatrist is "sworn to devote himself to the preservation of
human life, [and that] dealing out opinions whereby the survival
or destruction of another human being hinges on the turn of a
word" perverts the role of the psychiatric profession as a
237. Ewing, Diagnosing and Treating Insanity on Death Row: Legal and Ethical
Perspectives, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 175, 180-81 (1987).
238. Ward, supra note 32, at 76.
239. Id. at 84.
240. Id. at 84-85.
241. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 32, at 45 n.25.
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whole.242 Doctors Radelet and Barnard counter that the problem
in accepting this position is that if psychiatrists opposed to the
death penalty refuse to evaluate prisoners for competency to be
executed, the alternative would be to encourage participation by
psychiatrists who are, perhaps, less principled.4 "
Others would argue that the psychiatrist should only par-
ticipate to the extent of examining the prisoner and re-
porting the level of mental disease or impairment but
avoid the ultimate question of competency to be exe-
cuted. Still others would argue that the psychiatrist
should do a psychiatric examination, arrive at a diagnosis
using DSM-11124 criteria, and then attempt to bridge the
(inevitable) gap between medical diagnosis and legal
opinion by rendering a recommendation regarding com-
petency to be executed.24
It has been suggested that many of the difficulties with
utilizing mental health professionals in insanity-competency
proceedings arise from the absence of procedural safeguards and
the imprecision of statutory procedures.24 6 One factor often
raised is the lack of a coherent, intelligible, or workable standard
of competency which the psychiatrist can apply.' 2 4  Indeed,
Radelet and Barnard observe that "[t]he first ethical problem
for physicians involved in this process directly relates to the is-
sues of vagueness and lack of clarity .. ."248 Granting that the
"[psychiatric] profession has made great advances in recent
years in attempting to specify definitions and increase the relia-
242. West, supra note 218, at 694. West notes that "[miany psychiatrists refuse any
longer to serve as expert witnesses in capital cases, only to find themselves consequently
criticized for lack of social responsibility." Id. Professor Ewing opines: "[t]o render a
clinical judgment which has the practical effect of authorizing the execution of a con-
victed capital defendant is clearly contrary to the fundamental ethical commitments of
psychology and psychiatry to healing and the relief of human suffering." Ewing, supra
note 237, at 182.
243. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 32, at 45.
244. "DSM-III is the common abbreviation for the standard manual of psychiatric
diagnoses." Bazelon, The Dilemma of Criminal Responsibility, 72 Ky. L.J. 263, 270 n.11
(1983-1984).
245. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 32, at 45.
246. Ward, supra note 32, at 76.
247. Id.
248. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 32, at 45.
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bility of psychiatric diagnoses" they note that
"[i]ncompetency. . .is a legal rather than a medical concept." 49
It involves assessments and opinions, not diagnoses and
facts. The lack of clarity in the statute's definition of
'competency to be executed' means that the individual
psychiatrists are given wide latitude in defining the sta-
tus they are asked to assess, creating the possibility for
capricious decisions. If the legal definition of incompe-
tency is imprecise, then other factors, such as the psychi-
atrist's opinion of the death penalty, the heinousness of
the offense, and the amiability of the defendant may, at
least unconsciously, affect the assessment.2 5
They explain that while the accuracy of psychiatric diagno-
ses and evaluations may always be subject to criticism, an evalu-
ation to determine one's competency to be executed is one of the
few done by psychiatrists whereby a diagnosis can become a
question of life or death.25 1 Thus, Radelet and Barnard conclude
that the magnitude of the interests at stake "make the question
of the validity and reliability of psychiatric diagnoses and opin-
ions of more crucial significance than in any other area of psy-
chiatric practice."' 52
To compensate for the lack of clarity and the important is-
sues at stake, Doctors Radelet and Barnard note that psychia-
trists who participate in insanity inquiries must perform as thor-
ough and detailed an examination as possible.2 53 "On ethical
grounds alone, the magnitude of the harm to the subject from
incorrect conclusions would seem to justify a 'super' level of care
in psychiatric assessments. . .when the death sentence may be
involved." '' They note that the three psychiatrists who ex-
amined Alvin Ford were criticized by defense psychiatrists for
failing to conduct a detailed examination and for utilizing inade-
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 45-46.
252. Id. at 46.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 43 (citing S.L. HALLECK, P. APPLEBAUM, J. BAPPEPORT & G.E. Dix, REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS 181-215
(1984)).
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quate and unspecified techniques of evaluation.255 The three
psychiatrists appointed by the Florida Governor interviewed
Ford for only thirty minutes, in surroundings not necessarily
conducive to performing an insanity evaluation, and failed to
provide specific details as to the procedures used to arrive at
their evaluation that Ford was competent for execution.256 De-
fense psychiatrists claimed that the physicians failed to perform
a reliable forensic evaluation:257 Radelet and Barnard emphasize
that such competency evaluations must be performed with the
highest level of professional skill; "no other standard is possible
when the purpose is deciding who shall live and who shall
die.
25 8
Some psychiatrists note that their ethics are compromised
by this "catch-22" situation in that a decision not to render
treatment allows for an individual to continue to live in a state
of pain and suffering.2 9 "The suffering of psychotics is one of
the most intense sufferings that can be experienced," says psy-
chiatrist Paul Appelbaum, Chairman of the American Psychiat-
ric Association's commission on judicial action. "We don't feel
comfortable not treating these people [under death sentences],
but we feel even less comfortable treating them.
'26 °
In a debate over the propriety of treating condemned men-
tally ill inmates at the annual American Psychological Associa-
tion ("A.P.A.") meeting in 1987, Dr. Loren H. Roth argued that
in such a situation the psychiatrist is taking part in treating, not
executing the prisoner.2 1 Noting that the state was responsible
for the imposition of the death sentence, Roth maintained that
psychiatric intervention could not be withheld from a psychotic
individual because the treating doctor was uncomfortable with
the outcome of the patient's restoration to competency.
26 2
However, Dr. William Webb, Chairman of the Ethics Com-
mittee of the A.P.A. states: "You can put on blinders to the sys-




259. Adler, supra note 210, at 29.
260. Id.
261. Forensic Experts Debate Ethics of Restoring Prisoners' Competency to Allow




tern and say you are just concerning yourself with the pain of
the person's psychosis-you treat that and let the legal system
go on. [But] it approaches the ethical dilemma of the
Nuremburg situation. If the process is unethical and you partici-
pate in it in some way, then you may share responsibility.""26
Thus, treatment for the purpose of restoring an individual
to competency takes on a hideous connotation where in the
"course of curing, doctors may be killing." 64 Steven Adler, au-
thor of "The Cure That Kills," notes that the issues and con-
flicts raised by the Ford decision will multiply "[a]s some of
Florida's 248 death row inmates establish incompetence by rea-
son of insanity, they will be transferred under Florida law to the
Corrections Mental Health Institution (CMHI), where-if all
goes well in treatment-they will be rendered healthy enough to
be executed.21 65 The same author, after noting that it costs ap-
proximately $60,000 a year per inmate to provide treatment and
a safe environment to such prisoners-people who have stunned
and offended society with their hideous crimes, questions
whether the Supreme Court was wrong.26" Taking issue with the
majority's rationale, he argues that:
263. Adler, supra note 210, at 29. In a recent article in the New England Journal of
Medicine it was noted that after World War II, during the war-crimes trials, physicians
accused of crimes against humanity uniformly invoked the defense that they were under
official orders to perform certain actions and were threatened with personal punishment
or loss of their position for failure to cooperate. "The defense was rejected as a violation
of the moral imperative to refuse to kill or to harm the prisoners, or to take part in the
atrocities in any way." Sounding Board, 302 N.E. J. OF MED. (Jan. 1987), at 227.
The same author notes that:
It is important to recognize that such practices have not been limited to one
country or one time. In the Soviet prison camps, according to Solzhenitsyn: The
prison doctor was the interrogator's and the executioner's right hand man. The
beaten prisoner would come to on the floor only to hear the doctor's voice: you
can continue, the pulse is normal. . . .If the prisoner is beaten to death he signs
the death certificate: 'cirrhosis of the liver' or 'coronary occlusion.' He gets an
urgent call to a dying prisoner and takes his time. And whoever behaves differ-
ently is not kept on in the prison. (emphasis added).
These are extreme examples but the purpose to citing to them is to raise conscious-
ness levels as to the dangers involved when a professional is forced to work under cir-
cumstances which can be construed as ethically uncertain. If a mental health profes-
sional feels uncomfortable or otherwise is opposed to treating a condemned inmate for
the purpose of restoring such person to sanity, what mechanisms will be available for
ensuring that that person's employment position will be unaffected?
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 31.
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Executing the insane may actually have more deterrent
value than sparing them, since it will increase the fre-
quency of executions and eliminate an apparent 'loop-
hole.' And why does executing Gary Alvord,27 [a current
resident at CMHI] who strangled 3 [generations] of
women to death, 'offend humanity' any more or less than
the 1979 execution of John Spenkelink, who killed a fel-
low drifter he was traveling with? And in a more secular
society than Blackstone's, it may no longer be as impor-
tant to require that the condemned person be of sound
mind to meet his maker.2
In answer to the question, "is it crueler to execute someone
who doesn't understand that he is about to die than to kill
someone who does?" Dr. Appelbaum states, "It may be kinder to
put to death those people who aren't aware of what's happening
to them. ' 269 Dr. Carl Bell of the National Medical Association
strongly disagrees. He states that "[people] want to die with dig-
nity, they don't want to die babbling walking down the hall.
'270
As Ward notes, analyzing the historic rule which proscribes
the execution of an incompetent offender forces one to address
the ultimate moral question of when the state may properly
punish by taking life. 1 Professor Weihofen observed, "[tihe
real issue is whether it is less humane to execute a guilty crimi-
nal while he is insane than it is to postpone the execution until
we make sure that he understands what we mean to do to
him-and then kill him.
'272
The answers to these questions are ones upon which honest
persons may differ; yet one thing is clear: "if one rejects the idea
of executing the insane, the search begins for ways to minimize
or eliminate the ethical problems created by treating them.
'27 3
Doctors Radelet and Barnard note that if an inmate is an-
nounced incompetent for execution and consequently trans-
267. For a review of the facts of the Aluord case, see Ward, supra note 32, at 35, 42,
44-45; and Radelet & Barnard, supra note 32 at 52-53 n.38.
268. Adler, supra note 210, at 31.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Ward, supra note 32, at 100.
272. Radelet & Barnard, supra 32, at 41 n.18.
273. Adler, supra note 210, at 32-33.
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ferred to a mental health facility, the mental health staff respon-
sible for treating the prisoner knows that "successful" treatment
means that the patient-inmate will die.2"4 This use of the state's
limited treatment resources may be perceived as especially out-
rageous.21 5 Some observe that such issues as informed consent
and the right to refuse treatment will be implicated in such
cases, as well as the refusal by individual mental health practi-
tioners to provide treatment under such conditions27 6 "Mental
health treatment is supposed to be provided for the benefit of
the patient, but in such cases the patient will obviously not
benefit.
,277
In The Cure That Kills, Stephen Adler portrays poignantly
the ethical catch-22 situation in which mental health profession-
als may find themselves in treating the mentally incompetent
death row inmate .27 He reminds us of the plight of bombardier
Yossarian (in Joseph Heller's World War II book), who wants to
abandon the battlefield and return home because he is "crazy."
"[fln hearing Yossarian's complaints about the dangers associ-
ated with the war, the doctor-who works for the military, de-
cides that [Yossarian] is perfectly sane. . . [and would] be crazy
to want to stay on the battlefield. Thus, Yossarian is sent back
to war.
21 e
Adler analogizes an inmate's situation at CMHI to that of
Yossarian: the treatment team has the power to provide the
"same kind of good news to [the patient]-the moment he shows
signs of sanity, the treatment team will give him a pat on the
back for cooperating so well with the treatment-and a ticket
for the first leg of his trip back to death row.
'2 80
The debate on the propriety of executing the insane is likely
to continue unabated. In an era where crime in America has
reached the crisis stage, overcrowded prisons are commonplace,
and many feel compelled to offer tough talk and suggest tough
measures, 8' it is probable that many Americans cannot fathom




278. Adler, supra note 210, at 33.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Bazelon, supra note 244, at 277. Judge Bazelon notes that "[t]he insanity de-
19881
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
that an issue even exists. To some, to spend upwards of $60,000
per year to "cure" Gary Alvord in order to execute him borders
the ridiculous. Staunch proponents of the death penalty,
whatever their basis for belief in such punishment, would find
little sympathy for such a person or be repulsed by his execu-
tion, whether he be competent or not.
It is horrendously difficult to come to terms with many of
the issues raised by Ford v. Wainwright. Where an individual
has committed a heinous crime, it may be difficult for Americans
as well as health care professionals in some instances, to look
upon that individual as worthy of any kind of care. Anger at the
criminal as well as a system which will expend substantial finan-
cial resources toward his upkeep is a legitimate emotion. Yet, as
Judge Bazelon notes in discussing the dilemma of criminal re-
sponsibility, "righteous rage even if eloquently or loudly ex-
pressed, will not solve the problem." ' Writing about the in-
sanity defense, he notes, "[t]he community must realize that the
solution to the problem of crime is not in casting out its outcasts
a second time, but in reaching out and fashioning a community
to which all can belong." 8 3 Judge Bazelon observes that "over a
century ago, Dostoevesky put these words in the mouth of a mi-
nor character in Crime and Punishment: 'In this age the senti-
ment of compassion is actually prohibited by science.' Let it not
be said that it is prohibited by law." ''
CONCLUSION
"In the history of murder, the onset of insanity while await-
ing execution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon."
This observation made by Justice Frankfurter explains the very
reason for the existence of the opinion in Ford v. Wainwright.
The "onset of insanity" while on death row is not an unusual
occurrence and many death row inmates do become severely im-
paired perhaps as a direct result of the stress of an existence on
death row. If, as a society we have rejected the taking of the life
of an inmate who becomes incompetent while awaiting execu-






tion, then we as a society must produce a viable alternative for
that man's destiny.
The purpose of this paper has been to explore some of those
alternatives and to highlight the special issues involving the
treatment of death row inmates who become incompetent while
awaiting execution. It is the conclusion of this author that re-
quiring the participation of psychiatrists and other mental
health professionals is not a viable alternative. Perhaps some
mental health professionals will refuse to participate; perhaps as
Doctors Radelet and Barnard have postured, less principled psy-
chiatrists will be glad to. Or, perhaps mental health profession-
als opposed to participating in "the cure that kills" but economi-
cally dependent on their positions, will render treatment despite
the fact that it is morally repugnant to them. To request this of
a profession sworn to alleviate suffering is to request too much.
The social costs incurred by involving the mental health profes-
sion in this aspect of the administration of justice are too high.
Providing treatment in such a situation affords the condemned
with inadequate safeguards and also serves to pervert the role of
the treating clinicians involved. Too many extraneous factors are
implicated: one cannot ignore the issues of informed consent and
the inmate's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion; one cannot ignore the fact that most capital crimes involve
homicidal behavior that is beyond the understanding and sym-
pathy of even trained counselors and physicians. It is not
enough to tell psychiatrists and other mental health profession-
als to be sensitive to the special burdens they bear in treating
death row inmates such as Alvin Ford; it is not enough to tell
them to be sensitive to the limits of their understanding. It is
not enough because such warnings are inadequate in affording
protection to the condemned as well as the mental health pro-
fessionals involved. In such a situation, the condemned will not
be provided with the best possible treatment, and the mental
health profession should take no part in "helping" an individual
escape the agony of mental illness only to preside over his execu-
tion. Such participation denigrates the entire profession and the
individuals involved-both the condemned and the clini-
cians-will suffer.
Better alternatives exist. The hellish conditions on death
rows should be improved in an attempt to stem some of the
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stress associated with existence on death row. Finally, for those
inmates who do become incompetent and are in need of the ser-
vices of the mental health profession, a death sentence should be
commuted to life in prison. Such an alternative can still satisfy
society's desire for retribution. More importantly, it lends a
sense of decency and dignity to the proceedings involved, and
fails to implicate an entire profession's ethical and moral code
by allowing physicians and other clinicians to provide the treat-
ment and care they are sworn to administer.
Joan P. Cafone
